2026 | Vol 2(8) | August

Background of the Case

Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., 2026 INSC 784, is a significant criminal law judgment of the Supreme Court of India concerning the applicability of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860,(IPC) to relationships that are not legally recognised marriages but are in the nature of marriage. The judgment was delivered on 3 August 2026 by a Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh.

The dispute arose between Dr. Lokesh B.H., the appellant, and respondent no. 2, Smt. Theertha. According to respondent no. 2, the parties had married according to Hindu customs and rituals on 17 October 2010 and thereafter lived together in Bengaluru. Subsequently, differences arose between them, leading to criminal proceedings. The allegations included cruelty, dowry harassment and other acts of physical and mental harassment. The prosecution also alleged suppression of a previous marriage and physical injury to respondent no. 2.

The appellant disputed the existence of a valid marriage and approached the Karnataka High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,(CrPC) seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings. The High Court refused to interfere and held that the protection of Section 498A could not be defeated merely on the ground that the relationship was not a legally valid marriage. The appellant therefore approached the Supreme Court.

The principal legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the expression “husband” appearing in Section 498A could include a man who is in a live-in relationship with a woman where the relationship possesses the characteristics of a marriage.

Arguments by the Appellant

The appellant challenged the continuation of the criminal proceedings and argued that Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), specifically refers to cruelty by a “husband” or his relatives. According to the appellant, where there is no legally valid marriage, a person cannot be treated as a husband for the purpose of a penal provision.

The appellant's argument was substantially based on the principle of strict interpretation of penal statutes. Since criminal liability can result in serious consequences, a penal provision should not ordinarily be extended beyond the language used by the legislature. The appellant therefore contended that the word “husband” could not be expanded judicially to include an unmarried live-in partner.

It was also argued that merely living together for a considerable period does not automatically create a legal marriage. The appellant maintained that if Parliament intended to extend Section 498A to live-in relationships, such an amendment should be made by the legislature rather than by judicial interpretation.

The appellant consequently sought quashing of the criminal proceedings, contending that the essential relationship required for application of Section 498A was absent.

Arguments by the Respondents

The respondents opposed the appellant's request for quashing the criminal proceedings. Their central argument was that the protective purpose of Section 498A would be defeated if a person could avoid criminal liability merely by denying the existence of a valid marriage.

It was argued that the law should examine the substance and nature of the relationship rather than merely its legal label. Where two consenting adults live together in a relationship resembling marriage and the woman is subjected to cruelty, excluding her from the protection of Section 498A merely because the marriage is technically invalid would create an unjust result.

Reliance was placed on earlier decisions, including Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam and A. Subash Babu v. State of A.P., which recognised that the protective purpose of Section 498A cannot always be defeated by technical objections concerning the validity of marriage.

The respondents also relied upon constitutional principles, particularly equality, dignity and protection of women. The argument was that criminal law should not permit a person to take advantage of his own wrong by representing himself as a husband and subsequently escaping liability by asserting that no valid marriage existed.

At the same time, the respondents accepted that the protection should not automatically extend to every casual or temporary live-in relationship. The relationship must have characteristics of marriage and involve an intention to marry.

Decision of the Court and Reasoning

The Supreme Court refused to quash the criminal proceedings and allowed the trial to continue. The Court held that Section 498A IPC can extend to a live-in relationship that qualifies as a “relationship in the nature of marriage”, provided the necessary conditions, including an intention to marry, are established.

The Court's reasoning was based primarily on a purposive interpretation of Section 498A. Although criminal statutes ordinarily require careful and strict interpretation, the Court considered it necessary to interpret the provision in a manner that advances its underlying object of protecting women from cruelty within domestic relationships.

The Court examined the concept of a “relationship in the nature of marriage” and distinguished such relationships from ordinary or casual live-in arrangements. The mere fact that two people live together is not sufficient. The nature of the relationship, conduct of the parties and their intention are relevant considerations. In particular, the Court treated intention to marry as an important requirement for bringing such a relationship within the protection of Section 498A.

The Court also considered the relationship between Section 498A and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The existence of civil protection under the Domestic Violence Act could not, by itself, mean that criminal protection under Section 498A should be unavailable where the ingredients of cruelty are otherwise satisfied.

Importantly, the Court did not hold that every live-in relationship falls within Section 498A. Its interpretation was specifically confined to relationships between consenting adults which are in the nature of marriage and where an intention to marry is established. Thus, the judgment attempts to balance the protection of women with the need to prevent indiscriminate expansion of criminal liability.

On the facts of the case, the Court found that the allegations, including dowry harassment, suppression of a previous marriage and physical injury, prima facie disclosed a cognizable offence. Therefore, it concluded that this was not an appropriate case for exercising the power to quash the proceedings at the preliminary stage.

The Court further emphasised safeguards against unnecessary arrest and directed strict adherence to the principles laid down in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar. Thus, although the Court expanded the protective scope of Section 498A, it simultaneously recognised the importance of procedural safeguards for persons accused of cruelty.

Conclusion

The judgment in Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr. represents an important development in Indian criminal law because it addresses the gap between traditional concepts of marriage and contemporary forms of domestic relationships. The Supreme Court recognised that the protective purpose of Section 498A should not automatically disappear merely because the parties' relationship lacks the formal status of a legally valid marriage.

The decision is significant because it adopts a balanced approach. On one hand, it protects women in genuine marriage-like relationships from cruelty; on the other, it does not treat every live-in relationship as equivalent to marriage. The requirement of an intention to marry and the emphasis on the nature of the relationship provide important limitations.

The judgment can therefore be viewed as an attempt to harmonise strict criminal law principles with the social purpose of protective legislation. However, the interpretation may also create practical questions regarding how courts will determine the existence of a “relationship in the nature of marriage” and how intention to marry will be proved in individual cases.

Overall, the judgment strengthens legal protection against cruelty while recognising the need for safeguards against misuse. Its long-term significance will depend upon how trial courts apply the requirements laid down by the Supreme Court to the facts of individual cases.

References

Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., 2026 INSC 784

Reema Aggarwal Versus Anupam And Ors On 8th January, 2004 https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1180389/

A.Subash Babu vs State Of A.P.& Anr on 21 July, 2011 https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1342950/

Arnesh Kumar vs State Of Bihar & Anr on 2 July, 2014 https://indiankanoon.org/doc/2982624/

Noor Fatima Khan

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